The talk was given by K.Jack Riley.
The report he was discussing is available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG876/
(Free PDF downloads of the full report and short summary are available on that page too.)
It wasn't too painful, but did take about 2x the running time of the talk to do:
Original Audio MP3 is available at: http://www.box.net/shared/0chyu0ugfx
[recording misses the first few seconds of the talk, any typos/grammatical errors are my own]
The first is that Mexico lacks a road map with which to guide the operation and reform of their security institutions. #00:00:18.1#
The second is that there is a significant gap between the capabilities of the Federal on the one hand, and the state and local on the other hand, security organizations in Mexico. #00:00:31.2#
The third is that most of the assistance the US provides to Mexico is based on technology and equipment, rather than institution building and personnel support. #00:00:45.3#
And fourth, most of the assistance that the US provides, is narrowly construed to pursue direct US interests, such as drug control, and does relatively little to address the corrosive effects that crime and other associated ills are having on Mexican society. #00:01:02.5#
So let me consider each of these points briefly, just to fill in some the questions that this might raise. #00:01:10.5#
The violent crime rate in Mexico is high, although I think it's important to keep the scale in perspective. The latest reliable figures from 2004 that come from the UN, put the Mexican homicide rate at about 14 per 100,000 residents. So in a country of probably around 100MM back then, you're looking at a significant number of violent crimes. I use homicide as the comparison benchmark because among the violent crimes, it's the one that is the easiest to count. It's the most visible to authorities, unlike crimes like assault and kidnapping and so forth, which may never actually be reported, or where you may never know there's a victim. #00:01:58.4#
In contrast for the US, the homicide rate, the peak was around 10 per 100,000 in the 1990's, late 1980's early 1990s. If any of you recall in the middle of the crack epidemic this country's concern about homicide rate of 10 per 100,000 you know that the Mexican rate in 2004, which was 14, is pretty high. Of course the US rate dropped since then, and the Mexican rate has undoubtedly increased. So, in short there's a problem there, but even just looking at the US example, it's a problem that other societies have dealt with. #00:02:39.2#
President Calderon has tried to ameliorate these issues by providing resources, particularly at the Federal level against a specific set of issues with a lot of focus being on drug trafficking. But this a problem we've seen in Afghanistan, Liberia, Iraq and many other places, and that is that the strategy needs to reinforce all of the levers in the security sector. #00:03:06.2#
From the police and law enforcement, the prosecutors and the courts, thru on down to the prisons and the jails that house the convicted and offenders. There is no shortage of these types of institutions in mexico, and indeed mexico is squarely within international norms in terms of the provision of these services per capita. In fact, if I'm recalling correctly, they actually have more police per capita, than for example the United states does. The problem is the functioning of these institutions. And the specter of the judicial system is just not a credible deterrent when the criminals know that the police won't arrest, the courts wont prosecute and the jails won't hold. #00:03:52.3#
This relates to the gap between Federal and State and Local capabilities. #00:03:58.0#
For purposes of controlling corruption, president Calderon has been increasingly reliant on Federal forces and, in particular, Federal armed forces as opposed to Federal law enforcement forces to help combat the national ailments, particularly drug trafficking. But Federal forces can't always accomplish what state and local forces and authorities can, because state and local authorities may be better positioned to maneuver within the community as insiders to gain trust of needed supporters, such as informants and so forth. #00:04:35.7#
I mentioned that most of the assistance that the US provides to Mexico is the form of equipment and technology, and most of the overall aid when we looked at the resource tracking to Mexico was in one of these two categories. While we don't deny that there is a need for this kind of assistance to Mexico, it does tend to overlook the broader problem of getting Mexican institutions to function more effectively. #00:05:00.8#
More could be provided to support training, structuring, and management of Mexican security services in a way that would yield more positive results. #00:05:13.0#
Which brings me to the last of our findings, and the near midpoint of my talk. #00:05:22.9#
Namely that the US aid is given in pursuit of US objectives. Now this probably sounds axiomatic to anybody in the room, that aid is given to bolster the objectives of the giver. #00:05:31.3#
So, most of our bilateral assistance to Mexico is given to support counter-narcotics, border control, human trafficking and organized crime initiatives, with the focus on results for the United States. #00:05:46.9#
Those are worthy objectives, but I think many important respects, they are dwarfed by the problem of violent crime in Mexico. So part of our argument in the analysis is that US assistance needs to focus more on helping Mexico solve Mexican problems. #00:06:10.3#
The problems of crime and violence that stand overwhelm Mexican institutions, which in turn means that Mexican institutions may be unable to help the United States address problems that the United States cares about. #00:06:22.0#
So that's the report in a nutshell. Let me now turn to some of the reactions, and the issues that have arisen since. #00:06:30.6#
I would say there's been three general reactions to the report. #00:06:39.0#
The first is, and I'm paraphrasing from some of the email correspondence and blog activity that I've read, would be, "since most of the violence is related to the drug trade, isn't your book in effect an argument for legalization of drugs in the United States?" To which I typically respond, "what are you smoking?" #00:07:04.2#
There are severe flaws in the logic of this argument. You have to remember that there are multiple different drugs that are manufactured in, or trafficked thru Mexico; marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin. And I know of no serious analyst who would argue for the legalization or the decriminalization of any of those drugs (other than marijuana). #00:07:33.6#
Moreover, it isn't clear how the legalization or decriminalization of drugs here in the United States would affect drug trafficking and drug marketing activity in Mexico. #00:07:45.3#
For each drug, there's roughly a factor of 10 markup between the farm gate, (and I know there are no methamphetamine farms), and the intermediate or the wholesale price of the drug in Mexico. So, when the drug moves in its raw state, from a country like Colombia, as coca-leaf or coca-paste and it makes it to Mexico, there's roughly a factor of 10 markup in the price by the time it gets to Mexico. #00:08:18.0#
There's another factor of 10 markup before the drug hits the street retail location in the United States. So by the time the drug makes it from the farm or from the lab where it's produced to the United States, the price has increased by roughly a factor of 100. #00:08:35.1#
So the extent that legalization would actually lower US retail prices, to take the profit out of drug trafficking, if you will, it would tend to only act on prices at the retail level, and it would have very little effect on prices at the intermediate level, and most of the ones that matter in Mexico. #00:08:55.8#
Why? Because there would still be the risk of arrest, prosecution and so forth, for being involved in cocaine and herion trafficking. Regardless, legalization or decriminalization would do less to affect the farm gate and transit prices, because the laws and regulations would not be directly affecting these markets. You're not taking any of the risk out of the process of trafficking the drugs in Mexico, and it's simply not clear that legalization would do anything to ameliorate this problem. #00:09:30.0#
Second, some correspondents have criticized our report for ignoring the issue of the impact that Mexican violence has had on violence in the United States. We're not ignoring it, it doesn't really exist at least the way the proponents of this theory have put it forward. #00:09:50.1#
It is undeniable that some of the crime in Mexico is extraordinarily gruesome. #00:09:55.6#
Criminals have chopped off their victims heads, put them in coolers, and delivered them to police stations. The have rolled the severed head of their opponents and foes, across the floors of discos. Pardon the pun, but these are headline grabbing crimes, both in Mexico and the United States. #00:10:17.2#
Proponents of the border spillover argument make three main arguments. The first is that brazen mexican bandits are simply pursuing their foes into the US and it is Mexicans that are conducting these crimes in the United States. The second is that mexican drug lords are contracting with US street gangs, and other US-based criminals to do the dirty work for them in the US. And the third is simply that lawlessness in Mexico encourages lawlessness in border communities in the United States. #00:10:48.9#
But when you look at the data, the numbers tell a different story. There is no evidence of a worsening crime trend, violent or otherwise, in US border states or in states that have large ex-patriate Mexican populations. Overall whether you consider victimizations, arrests, or crimes reported to the police, violent crime has held within roughly the same range in the United States since 2002. Indeed in 2008, the uniform crime report given by the FBI indicated that there was a 2.5% crime decline nationally in terms of violent crime, 3.4% here in the western United States. #00:11:29.3#
The pattern most definitely varies by city, with Phoenix and San Diego down and Brownsville, El Paso and Loredo up slightly. But, in short, there is no clear overall trends and there certianly is no explosion in violence in the US that is related to Mexican activites. #00:11:48.8#
And if you think about it, this makes sense. What incentives do Mexican gangsters have to take on the US criminal justice system? #00:11:56.7#
They can accomplish what they need by subverting the far smaller and far weaker Mexican criminal justice system. Why risk being caught in the united states, where the odds of conviction are high, and the ability to bribe your way out of jail is relatively low? #00:12:13.8#
They may have foes that hide out here, and there are undoubtedly been violent crimes here that are related to mexican drug trafficking, but this is relatively individual-level activity, and I think it's the vividness of some of the crimes, and the overall impression that it creates. And the larger picture when you look at evidence rather than anecdote, is really one that shows one of relatively little impact in the US of violent crime trends in Mexico. #00:12:52.4#
Finally the third reaction to the report is, "given the problems in Mexico, shouldn't we just shut down the border? We could keep drugs, and potential terrorists out." #00:13:04.3#
Here I'm tempted to quip that the economic crisis and swine flu may have given us a head start on those two things, but people are serious about this as a set of policy options that need to be looked into. And so I'm going to talk about it in a little bit here. #00:13:24.7#
The reality is there is no benefit to closing down the border with Mexico. Las t year we exported over $150BB of goods to Mexico, according to methods used by the commerce department, the dept. of agriculture, and the us census. This translated into roughly 1.5M jobs here in the US that are connected to exports to Mexican markets. #00:13:46.3#
Moreover the cost of attempting to seal the borders would be astronomically high. Reflect just briefly, for example, on the experience at the Canadian and Mexican borders after 9/11, which is about as close to sealing the border as we think we've ever come in this country. Trucks lined up for 20 miles outside of Windsor, trying to get into Detroit. Similar scenarios played out at both the northern and southern borders. Auto manufacturers, drug manufacturers, service providers and a whole variety of other organizations ran short of critical inputs because they had come to rely on the free movement of goods over our borders for their economic livelihood. #00:14:34.0#
In short, taken literally, the idea of closing down the border is simply not credible or serious. Most people, however, I think interpret the call to close the borders to mean that we should more rigorously inspect cargo and people before they enter the United States in an effort to keep contraband out. #00:14:53.8#
This is the laudable sentiment, but it is difficult to implement in a very practical way. As I testified before congress in 2007, the technology does not exist that would allow us to effectively, efficiently, and inexpensively screen or search every truck, passenger car, rail car, and person entering in the United States from Mexico. #00:15:21.4#
So there you have it, the main reactions to, and the basic findings of our report. Let me conclude on a slightly optimistic note, that we do highlight in the report. And that is, tide of crime of violence in Mexico has created really an almost unparalleled opportunity for cooperation between our two countries. US policy makers are interested in providing the assistance to help ensure that the US achieves its goals in Mexico and with Mexico, and Mexican policy makers are increasingly willing to accept US assistance because of the magnitude of the problem. #00:16:03.7#
There is an alignment of incentives that has not been so previously clear, at least in my reading of the history. And many of the people that we spoke to when writing our report were aware of the alignment of the incentives and opportunities and were anxious to capitalize on it. #00:16:19.5#
Thank you. #00:16:21.0#
(Q&A follows) #00:16:24.0#
Q: Could you tell me what was the most surprising result that you came across in your research? #00:16:46.1#
A: I personally having a long, sordid, involvement in drug and crime issues, wasn't surprised by a lot of the findings in that area, except for one. And that was going into doing the analysis I was convinced, I think I believed the hype, that the problems in Mexico were really spilling over into the US, and I was most surprised not to find the evidence of that, but it's pretty clear. #00:17:17.0#
More Q&A follows (not transcribed), including some lively discussion by the Mexican Consul and audience members.
